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IS POST-KELO EMINENT DOMAIN REFORM BAD 
FOR THE POOR? 
Ilya Somin* 
INTRODUCTION 
In a recent article in the Northwestern University Law Review Collo-
quy,1 Professor David Dana argues that most post-Kelo reform efforts are 
seriously flawed because they tend to forbid the condemnation of the prop-
erty of the wealthy and the middle class for ―economic development,‖ but 
allow the condemnation of land on which poor people live under the guise 
of alleviating ―blight.‖  This, he claims, results in reform laws that ―privi-
lege[] the stability of middle-class households relative to the stability of 
poor households‖ and ―express[] the view that the interests and needs of 
poor households are relatively unimportant.‖2 
I agree with Professor Dana that the problem of blight condemnations 
and its impact on the poor deserves much greater attention, and that post-
Kelo reform initiatives should do more to address these concerns.  Howev-
er, I disagree with his argument that post-Kelo reform efforts have syste-
matically treated land where the poor tend to live worse than that of middle 
and upper class homeowners.  As of this time (March 2007), most of the 
states that have enacted post-Kelo reform laws have either banned both 
blight and economic development takings (five states, plus Utah, which 
enacted its reform law prior to Kelo), or defined ―blight‖ so broadly that 
virtually any property can be declared ―blighted‖ and taken (sixteen states).  
Several other states have enacted reforms that provide no real protection to 
any property owners because of other types of shortcomings.  Only nine 
states are actually guilty of the sin condemned by Professor Dana of allow-
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  David Dana, The Law and Expressive Meaning of Condemning the Poor after Kelo, 101 NW. U. L. 
REV. 365 (2007), 101 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 5 (2006), http://www.law.northwestern.edu 
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To the extent that some states have indeed banned ―economic devel-
opment‖ condemnations in affluent neighborhoods, while permitting 
―blight‖ condemnations to go on in poor ones, I agree that this is a lamenta-
ble state of affairs.  However, it may still be a better result than simply sub-
jecting all property to the risk of economic development takings.  A law 
that protects the property rights of most but not all of the population is pre-
ferable to one that protects no one.  Such a law might also benefit many 
poor people who live in nonblighted areas and are potentially vulnerable to 
economic development takings.  Survey data suggests that the poor them-
selves overwhelmingly oppose economic development condemnations. 
Furthermore, the exclusion of blighted property from some states‘ bans 
on ―economic development‖ condemnations in some states is not necessari-
ly explained by indifference to or contempt for the interests of the poor.  
There are perfectly noninvidious (though in my view flawed) reasons for 
believing that condemnation is sometimes necessary to eliminate blight.  
There are few or no reasons, however, to use condemnation to promote 
economic development through the transfer of property to private owners. 
I. POST-KELO REFORM AND THE POOR. 
Since Kelo v. City of New London3 was decided in June 2005, twenty-
eight states have enacted eminent domain reforms through the regular legis-
lative process and ten (including several that also enacted legislative re-
forms) by referendum.  Altogether, thirty-five states have enacted reforms 
that purport to ban or restrict ―economic development‖ takings.  The state 
of Utah banned both economic development takings and blight condemna-
tions in early 2005, before Kelo was decided.4  Seventeen of the twenty-
eight reforms enacted by state legislatures are largely ineffective, providing 
little or no real protection to property owners against economic develop-
ment takings.5  This is also true of several of the reforms enacted by refe-
rendum.  With respect to these states, Professor Dana‘s claim that middle 
class households are getting better protection than the poor is incorrect be-
cause, quite simply, neither group is getting any real protection at all. 
In at least sixteen states, post-Kelo reforms have been ineffective be-
cause they contain ―blight‖ exceptions so broad that virtually any property 





  545 U.S. 469 (2005) (link). 
4
  See UTAH CODE ANN. § 17C-1-202 (amended May 1, 2006) (link) (outlining powers of redeve-
lopment agencies and omitting the power to use eminent domain for blight alleviation or development); 
see also Henry Lamb, Utah Bans Eminent Domain Use by Redevelopment Agencies, ENV. NEWS, June 
1, 2005, available at http://www.heartland.org/article.cfm?artID=17162 (link) (describing the politics 
behind the Utah law). 
5
  I discuss this in much greater detail in a recent paper.  See Ilya Somin, The Limits of Backlash:  
Assessing the Political Response to Kelo, George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 07-14, 
Mar.  27, 2007, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=976298 (link). 
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wealthy neighborhoods.6  For example, nine state post-Kelo laws incorpo-
rate definitions of ―blight‖ that include any area where there are obstacles to 
―sound growth‖ or conditions that constitute an ―economic or social liabili-
ty.‖  These include reform laws in Alaska,7 Colorado,8 Missouri,9 Ne-





  For a more detailed analysis of these reform laws and the reasons why they are unlikely to have 
any meaningful effect, see id. at 15–21. 
7
  See H.B. 318, 24th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Alaska 2006) (enacted July 5, 2006) (link) (exempting preex-
isting public uses declared in state law from a ban on economic development takings); ALASKA STAT. § 
18.55.950 (2006) (link) (―‗[B]lighted area‘ means an area, other than a slum area, that by reason of the 
predominance of defective or inadequate street layout, faulty lot layout in relation to size, adequacy, ac-
cessibility, or usefulness, unsanitary or unsafe conditions, deterioration of site or improvements, tax or 
special assessment delinquency exceeding the fair value of the land, improper subdivision or obsolete 
platting, or the existence of conditions that endanger life or property by fire and other causes, or any 
combination of these factors, substantially impairs or arrests the sound growth of the municipality, re-
tards the provision of housing accommodations, or constitutes an economic or social liability and is a 
menace to the public health, safety, morals, or welfare in its condition and use.‖).  Professor Dana inter-
prets this statute as failing to address blight condemnations ―at all.‖  Dana, supra note 1, at 15.  Howev-
er, the text of the law does in fact exempt blight condemnations from its scope by exempting all 
preexisting public uses declared in state law, of which blight is one. 
8
  See H.B. 1411, 65th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2006) (enacted June 6, 2006) (link) (allowing 
condemnation for ―eradication of blight‖); COLO. REV. STAT. § 31-25-103(2) (2006) (link) (defining 
―blight‖ to include  any condition  that ―substantially impairs or arrests the sound growth of the munici-
pality, retards the provision of housing accommodations, or constitutes an economic or social liability, 
and is a menace to the public health, safety, morals, or welfare‖). 
9
  See S.B. 1944, § 523.271.2, 93rd Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2006) (enacted July 13, 2006) 
(link) (exempting blight condemnations from ban on ―economic development‖ takings); MO. REV. 
STAT. §  100.310(2) (2006) (link) (defining ―blight‖ as ―an area which, by reason of the predominance 
of defective or inadequate street layout, insanitary or unsafe conditions, deterioration of site improve-
ments, improper subdivision or obsolete platting, or the existence of conditions which endanger life or 
property by fire and other causes, or any combination of such factors, retards the provision of housing 
accommodations or constitutes an economic or social liability or a menace to the public health, safety, 
morals, or welfare in its present condition and use‖). 
10
  See L.B. 924, 99th Leg., 2nd Sess. (Neb. 2006) (enacted April 13, 2006) (exempting ―blight‖ 
condemnations from ban on economic development takings); NEB. REV. STAT. § 18-2103 (2006) (link) 
(defining blight to include any area in a condition that ―substantially impairs or arrests the sound growth 
of the community, retards the provision of housing accommodations, or constitutes an economic or so-
cial liability‖ and has ―deteriorating‖ structures).  
11
  See H.B. 1965, § 2.1, 2005 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2006) (enacted Aug. 10, 2006) (link) 
(Exempting blight condemnations from restrictions on economic development takings and stating that 
―‗[b]lighted area‘ shall mean an area in which there is a predominance of buildings or improvements (or 
which is predominantly residential in character), and which, by reason of dilapidation, deterioration, age 
or obsolescence, inadequate provision for ventilation, light, air, sanitation, or open spaces, high density 
of population and overcrowding, unsanitary or unsafe conditions, or the existence of conditions which 
endanger life or property by fire and other causes, or any combination of such factors, substantially im-
pairs the sound growth of the community, is conducive to ill health, transmission of disease, infant mor-
tality, juvenile delinquency and crime, and is detrimental to the public health, safety, morals or 
welfare.‖). 
12
  See S.B. 167, § 1, 126th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2005) (link) (exempting ―blight‖ con-
demnations from temporary moratorium on economic development takings); OH. REV. CODE ANN. § 
303.26(E) (West 2006) (link) (defining blight to include ―deterioration‖ of structures or where the site 
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Any obstacle to economic development can easily be defined as impairing 
―sound growth,‖ making this definition of blight broad enough to justify 
virtually any condemnation that could be justified under an economic de-
velopment rationale.  Similarly, any impediment to ―economic develop-
ment‖ can be considered an ―economic or social liability.‖  Seven other 
states, including Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Tennessee, Wisconsin,16 
and the crucial state of California,17 have differently worded but comparably 
broad blight exemptions.  Several more states have enacted post-Kelo laws 
that fail to protect property owners for other reasons.18 
State courts have, for decades, interpreted similar definitions of blight 
to allow the condemnation of nearly any property a local government seeks 
to acquire.  For example, recent state appellate court decisions have held 
that Times Square in New York City19 and downtown Las Vegas20 are 
―blighted,‖ thereby justifying condemnations undertaken to acquire land for 
a new headquarters for the New York Times and parking lots for a consor-
tium of local casinos respectively.  If these areas could be considered 
blighted, so too could virtually any others.  Sixteen states, however, have 
enacted post-Kelo reform laws that do provide substantial protection for 
property owners relative to that which existed previously—nine by legisla-
tion, four by referendum initiative, and three by both of these means.21  
Many of these jurisdictions, however, have banned blight condemnations as 
                                                                                                                           
―substantially impairs or arrests the sound growth of a county, retards the provision of housing accom-
modations, or constitutes an economic or social liability and is a menace to the public health, safety, 
morals, or welfare‖). 
13
  See S.B. 7, 79th Leg., 2nd Sess. (Tex. 2005) (enacted Sept. 1, 2005) (link) (exempting ―blight‖ 
condemnations from ban on economic development takings); TEX. LOCAL GOV‘T CODE Ann. § 374 
(Vernon 2006) (link) (defining a ―blighted area‖ as one that ―because of deteriorating buildings, struc-
tures, or other improvements; defective or inadequate streets, street layout, or accessibility; unsanitary 
conditions; or other hazardous conditions, adversely affects the public health, safety, morals, or welfare . 
. . or results in an economic or social liability to the municipality‖). 
14
  See S.B. 246, 2005–06 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Vt. 2006) (link) (exempting blight condemnations from 
ban on economic development takings, and defining blight to include any planning or layout condition 
that ―substantially impairs or arrests the sound growth of a municipality, retards the provision of housing 
accommodations or constitutes an economic or social liability and is a menace to the public health, safe-
ty, morals, or welfare‖). 
15
  See H.B. 4048, 77th Leg., Reg. Sess. (W.Va. 2006) (enacted April 2006) (link) (exempting blight 
condemnation from ban and defining blight to include an area that, for any number of factors such as 
deterioration or inadequate street layout, ―substantially impairs or arrests the sound growth of a munici-
pality, retards the provision of housing accommodations or constitutes an economic or social liability 
and is a menace to the public health, safety, morals, or welfare‖). 
16
  For a discussion of blight exemptions in these states, see Somin, supra note 5, at 18–22. 
17
  Id. at 21–22. 
18
  Id. at 26–28. 
19
  See In re W. 41st St. Realty v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 744 N.Y.S.2d 121 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2002).  
20
  See City of Las Vegas Downtown Redev. Agency v. Pappas, 76 P.3d 1, 12–15 (Nev. 2003).   
21
  See Somin, supra note 5, at 10–14. 
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well as ―economic development‖ takings, thereby going against Professor 
Dana‘s argument that Post-Kelo reform has ignored the needs of poor 
people who live in blighted areas. 
The state of Florida has banned blight condemnations and economic 
development takings in its unusually strong post-Kelo reform law,22 despite 
its extensive past use of blight condemnations.  Referendum initiatives in 
Nevada and North Dakota similarly ban blight condemnation completely.23  
South Dakota‘s post-Kelo reform law continues to permit blight condemna-
tions, but greatly reduces the political incentive to engage in them by for-
bidding the transfer of condemned property to private parties.24  This rule 
prevents the use of blight condemnations to transfer property to politically 
influential interest groups, eliminating one of the main political incentives 
for undertaking them in the first place.  Kansas‘ new law, meanwhile, limits 
blight condemnations to cases where the property in question is ―unsafe for 
occupation by humans under the building codes.‖25  And as we have seen, 
the Utah reform law enacted a few months before Kelo also banned blight 
condemnations. 
In sum, of the seventeen states (counting Utah) that have recently 
enacted eminent domain reform laws with real teeth of any kind, six have 
either abolished blight condemnations or come close to doing so.  Of the 
remaining eleven states, most do indeed protect middle and upper class 
neighborhoods by defining blight narrowly.26  However, two of these 
states—Minnesota and Pennsylvania—also provide only very limited pro-
tection even to middle class neighborhoods because their bans on economic 
development takings exempt the major urban areas (Philadelphia, Pitts-
burgh, and the Twin Cities) where most of those states‘ condemnations take 
place.27 
Overall, only nine of the thirty-six states that have enacted reform leg-
islation in the wake of Kelo or, in the case of Utah, immediately before it, 
seem to even roughly fit the predictions of Professor Dana‘s thesis that 





  See H.B. 1567, 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2006) (enacted May 11, 2006) (link). 
23
  See Nev. Ballot Question 2 (enacted Nov. 7, 2006 as NEV. CONST. art. I, § 22 §§ 1) (link) (for-
bidding the ―direct or indirect transfer of any interest in property taken in an eminent domain proceeding 
from one private party to another private party‖); N.D. Measure 2 (enacted Nov. 7, 2006 as N.D. CONST. 
art. I, § 16) (link) (―[P]ublic use or a public purpose does not include public benefits of economic devel-
opment, including an increase in tax base, tax revenues, employment, or general economic health.  Pri-
vate property shall not be taken for the use of, or ownership by, any private individual or entity, unless 
that property is necessary for conducting a common carrier or utility business.‖) . 
24
  H.B. 1080, 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (S.D. 2006) (signed into law Feb. 27, 2006) (link).  Professor 
Dana claims that South Dakota‘s law doesn‘t address blight condemnations ―at all.‖  Dana, supra note 1, 
at 16.  However, private-to-private blight condemnations are surely covered by the law‘s general ban on 
private to private takings of any kind. 
25
  S.B. 323, §§ 1–2, 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2006) (signed into law May 18, 2006) (link). 
26
  See Somin, supra note 5, at 28–33 (discussing these laws in detail). 
27
  Id. at 27–30. 
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW COLLOQUY  
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2007/15/ 200 
ing the poor.  The states in this category include Alabama, Arizona, Geor-
gia, Idaho, Indiana, Louisiana, Michigan, Oregon, and New Hampshire.28  
The remaining new laws either protect both groups more or less equally or 
provide no meaningful protection to anyone. 
This pattern—combined with the broad ―blight‖ exceptions in many of 
the post-Kelo laws—partially undermines Professor Dana‘s claims that 
post-Kelo reform protects the wealthy and the middle at the expense of the 
poor.  On the other hand, it is important to recognize—as I and other scho-
lars have contended in earlier work—that both blight and economic devel-
opment condemnations do, in practice, victimize the poor 
disproportionately.29  This is a serious problem, and one that requires great-
er scholarly, judicial and legislative attention.  However, post-Kelo reform 
has not noticeably exacerbated the problem, and in those states that have 
abolished or substantially curbed blight condemnations, reform may well 
help to alleviate it. 
II. ARE REFORM LAWS THAT STILL PERMIT BLIGHT CONDEMNATIONS 
BAD FOR THE POOR? 
Given that nine states have indeed enacted post-Kelo reform laws that 
fit the pattern outlined by Professor Dana, it is still important to ask whether 
such laws do in fact harm the poor for the benefit of the relatively affluent, 
as he contends.  Moreover, eleven state supreme courts have banned eco-
nomic development takings under their state constitutions (including two 
since Kelo), and none of them have so far also banned blight condemna-





  Id. at 26–29  
29
  See, e.g., Ilya Somin, Controlling the Grasping Hand:  Economic Development Takings after Ke-
lo, 15 SUP CT ECON. REV. (forthcoming 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=874865 (link); 
Wendell E. Pritchett, The “Public Menace” of Blight:  Urban Renewal and the Private Uses of Eminent 
Domain, 21 YALE L. & POL‘Y REV. 1 (2003) (link). 
30
  The eleven states are Arkansas, Florida, Illinois, Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, Montana, Ohio, 
Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Washington.  See City of Little Rock v. Raines, 411 S.W.2d 486, 494–
95 (Ark. 1967) (private economic development project not a public use); Baycol, Inc. v. Downtown 
Dev. Auth., 315 So.2d 451, 457 (Fla. 1975) (holding that a ―‗public [economic] benefit‘ is not syn-
onymous with ‗public purpose‘ as a predicate which can justify eminent domain . . . .‖); Sw. Ill. Dev. 
Auth. v. Nat‘l City Envtl., L.L.C., 768 N.E.2d 1, 9–11 (Ill. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 880 (2002) 
(link) (holding that a ―contribu[tion] to positive economic growth in the region‖ is not a public use justi-
fying condemnation); City of Owensboro v. McCormick, 581 S.W.2d 3, 8 (Ky. 1979) (―No ‗public use‘ 
is involved where the land of A is condemned merely to enable B to build a factory . . . .‖) (citation 
omitted); Opinion of the Justices, 131 A.2d 904, 906 (Me. 1957) (holding that private ―industrial devel-
opment‖ to enhance economy not a public use); County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 
2004) (link) (overruling Poletown and holding that economic development takings are unconstitutional); 
City of Bozeman v. Vaniman, 898 P.2d 1208, 1214 (Mont. 1995) (link) (holding that a condemnation 
that transfers property to a ―private business‖ is unconstitutional unless the transfer to the business is 
―insignificant‖ and ―incidental‖ to a public project); City of Norwood v. Horney, 853 N.E.2d 1115, 
1141–42 (Ohio 2006) (link) (following Hathcock in holding that ―economic benefit‖ alone does not jus-
tify condemnation); Bd. of County Comm‘rs of Muskogee County v. Lowery, 136 P.3d 639, 642 (Okla. 
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nent domain on the poor deserves greater consideration than it has so far re-
ceived, I am not persuaded that post-Kelo reforms banning economic de-
opment takings while narrowing the definition of blight are worse than the 
pre-Kelo status quo.  Such laws can provide valuable, even if still in-
quate, protection to the poor.  And, even if these reforms fail to help the 
poor, they are unlikely to inflict additional harm on them. 
It is important to recognize that even condemnations in ―nonblighted‖ 
areas are likely to disproportionately victimize the relatively poor.  For ex-
ample, the notorious 1981 Poletown takings in Detroit displaced some 
4,000 mostly working class residents of a Detroit neighborhood so that 
General Motors could build a new factory to promote ―economic develop-
ment.‖31  Reform statutes that ban economic development takings while si-
multaneously narrowing the definition of blight could well prevent future 
Poletowns.  This is an achievement, even if it still fails to protect poor 
people living in truly ―blighted‖ areas. 
Perhaps, however, such tangible benefits for the poor might be out-
weighed by the ―expressive‖ harms emphasized by Professor Dana.32  It is 
theoretically possible that the poor feel so stigmatized by the supposed 
―message‖ that their households are ―fundamentally unequal in importance‖ 
relative to middle class homes, that they might be willing to forego the 
tangible legal protection provided by post-Kelo reforms that ban economic 
development takings but do not completely abolish blight condemnations.33 
We cannot know for sure whether the poor feel this way.  However, 
survey evidence suggests that most do not.  Professor Dana notes that ―poor 
                                                                                                                           
2006) (link) (holding that ―economic development‖ is not a ―public purpose‖ under the Oklahoma Con-
stitution); Ga. Dep‘t of Transp. v. Jasper County, 586 S.E.2d 853, 856 (S.C. 2003) (link) (holding that 
even a substantial ―projected economic benefit‖ cannot justify condemnation); Karesh v. City of Char-
leston, 247 S.E.2d 342, 345 (S.C. 1978) (striking down taking justified only by economic development 
because such condemnations do not ensure ―that the public has an enforceable right to a definite and 
fixed use of the property‖ (quoting 29 C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 31)); In re City of Seattle, 638 P.2d 
549, 556–57 (Wash. 1981) (disallowing plan to use eminent domain to build retail shopping  as not for a 
public use);  Hogue v. Port of Seattle, 341 P.2d 171, 187 (Wash. 1959) (denying condemnation of resi-
dential property where government sought to ―devote it to what it considers a higher and better econom-
ic use‖).  In some of these states, the wording of the state constitution restricts private-to-private 
condemnations much more explicitly than does the Federal Takings Clause.  See, e.g., Muskogee, 136 
P.3d at 651–52 (discussing differences between the wording of the Oklahoma Constitution and that of 
the Fifth Amendment and using the distinction as justification for interpreting the state takings clause in 
a way contrary to the U.S. Supreme Court‘s interpretation of the Federal Takings Clause in Kelo).  The 
Norwood case did, however, suggest that some blight condemnations would violate the state constitu-
tion.  See Ilya Somin, Blight Sweet Blight, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 14, 2006, at 42 (discussing this aspect of  
Norwood). 
31
  See Ilya Somin, Overcoming Poletown:  County of Wayne v. Hathcock, Economic Development 
Takings, and the Future of Public Use, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1005, 1011–16 (link).  The Poletown 
condemnations were upheld in Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 
(Mich. 1981), overruled by Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 765 (link). 
32
  Dana, supra note 1, at 20–21.  
33
  Id. at 21. 
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people subject to blight condemnation differ from the middle-class people 
subject to economic development condemnation in two important respects:  
they are more often renters than home owners, and they have less income 
and wealth.‖34  Strikingly, however, neither of these important dividing 
lines is a strong predictor of public opinion on economic development tak-
ings.  Rich and poor and renters and homeowners all oppose them by lop-
sided margins.  Table 2 shows that all of these groups also support laws 
banning condemnations for private development. 
While survey evidence may not be a good indication of the physical 
and economic effects of condemnation on the poor, they provide an impor-
tant window on the ―expressive‖ and dignitary harms emphasized by Pro-
fessor Dana.  If the poor themselves oppose Kelo and support laws banning 
economic development takings, that suggests that any such harms are either 
nonexistent or so minor as to be imperceptible to their supposed victims. 
As Table 1 demonstrates, the November 2005 Saint Index survey of 
public opinion on Kelo shows that strong opposition to the decision cuts 
across class lines.35  Seventy percent of respondents from households earn-
ing under $10,000 per year expressed opposition, and 80% from those earn-
ing $10,000 to $24,999.  This is only slighly lower than the 89% opposition 
expressed by middle income households earning $35,000–$49,999 (the 
highest rate for any income group), and actually higher than that expressed 
by the very wealthiest category (those earning over $150,000), of  whom 
―only‖ 68% opposed Kelo.36 
The Saint Index survey question asked respondents whether they sup-
ported the Supreme Court ruling holding that ―local governments can take 
homes, business and private property to make way for private economic de-
velopment if officials believe it would benefit the public.‖37  Significantly, it 
refers only to ―economic development‖ condemnations and does not men-
tion blight. 
The Saint Index survey also shows that renters oppose Kelo almost as 
strongly as homeowners, thus casting doubt on Professor Dana‘s suggestion 
that post-Kelo reform inflicts dignitary harms on the former for the benefit 
of the latter.38  The Kelo decision was opposed by 83% of homeowners and 





  Id. at 20. 
35
  Center for Economic and Civic Opinion at University of Massachusetts/Lowell, The Saint Index 
Poll, Oct.–Nov. 2005 [hereinafter Saint Index] (unpublished survey, on file with author).  Question 
wording: ―The U.S. Supreme Court recently ruled that local governments can take homes, business and 
private property to make way for private economic development if officials believe it would benefit the 
public.  How do you feel about this ruling?‖ 
36
  One might expect this group to be the least opposed to economic development takings because it 
is highly unusual for property belonging to the wealthy to be condemned for transfer to other private 
parties. 
37
  Saint Index, supra note 35. 
38
  Dana, supra note 1, at 20–21. 
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―strongly.‖39  While the percentage of renters opposing economic develop-
ment takings was smaller than that of homeowners, it was still a lopsided 
70% to 28% margin.40 
 








VIEWS ON KELO 




Under $10,000 25 70 (58) 
$10,000–$24,999 20 80 (61) 
$25,000–$34,999 18 80 (62) 
$35,000–$49,999 11 89 (68) 
$50,000–$74,999 15 85 (67) 
$75,000–$150,000 25 73 (57) 
Over $150,000 32 68 (48) 
Total 18 81 (63) 
 
Table 2 provides direct evidence of popular support for state reform 
laws that ban condemnation of property for transfer to private developers—
the sorts of takings at issue in Kelo.42  Here too, survey respondents in all 
income categories supported post-Kelo reform by lopsided—and roughly 
equal—margins.  Although the very poorest respondents supported reform 
laws by the smallest margin of any income group—62% to 28%—
supporters still outnumbered opponents by more than two to one in that in-





  Saint Index, supra note 35. 
40
  Id. 
41
  Saint Index, supra note 35.  Question wording: ―The U.S. Supreme Court recently ruled that local 
governments can take homes, business and private property to make way for private economic develop-
ment if officials believe it would benefit the public.  How do you feel about this ruling?‖ 
42
  The wording of this survey is a bit unfortunate because it speaks of banning condemnations for 
―private development,‖ whereas the standard rationale for Kelo-style condemnations is that they benefit 
the general public, not just ―private‖ interests.  However, such differences in wording seem to have only 
a minor impact on survey respondents‘ expressed attitudes to economic development takings. For more 
detailed discussion, see Somin, supra note 5, at 6–7 & n.34. 
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that recorded in the second-lowest category, households earning between 
$10,000 and $24,999 per year.  This group of relatively poor respondents 
supported the enactment of laws banning condemnation of property for 
―private development‖ by an overwhelming 76%–19% margin.  The 2006 
Saint Index survey does provide modest support for Professor Dana‘s claim 
that renters‘ interests differ from those of homeowners.  Only 48% of ren-
ters supported reform laws in the survey, compared to 31% who were op-
posed.43  By contrast, 78% of homeowners supported banning takings for 
―private development,‖ with only 21% opposed.44  Even among renters, 
however, supporters of banning takings for private development outnum-
bered opponents by roughly a three to two margin. 
 















Under $10,000 62 (36) 28 (13) 
$10,000–$24,999 76 (48) 19 (8) 
$25,000–$34,999 65 (40) 29 (15) 
$35,000–$49,999 75 (44) 21 (8) 
$50,000–$74,999 69 (39) 23 (10) 
$75,000–$150,000 73 (49) 23 (9) 
Over $150,00046 N/A N/A 
Total 71 (43) 23 (10) 
 
I am also skeptical of Professor Dana‘s assumption that most of the 





  Center for Economic and Civic Opinion at University of Massachusetts/Lowell, The Saint Index 
Poll, Sept.–Oct. 2006 (unpublished survey, on file with author). 
44
  Id. 
45
  Id.  Question wording: ―Some states are considering enacting laws that will stop state and local 
governments from taking private property for private development projects. Would you . . . [Strongly 
Support, Support, Oppose, Strongly Oppose, or don‘t know] such laws?‖ 
46
  Only two respondents were recorded in this category. 
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opment takings, but not blight takings, do so because they believe that 
―staying in your home only really matters if you are a middle-class person 
in a middle-class home.‖47  It is possible that some voters hold this view.  
However, many others might believe that blight condemnations actually 
help the poor by ―cleaning up‖ their neighborhoods.  This was part of the 
historic rationale for blight condemnations, as Professor Dana admits.48 
 He emphasizes—and I emphatically agree—that real-world blight 
condemnations frequently harm the poor, often benefiting wealthy or mid-
dle class interests at their expense.49  However, given widespread public ig-
norance about takings policy—ignorance so great that most people did not 
realize that Kelo made little change to existing legal doctrine and that eco-
nomic development takings were widespread before that decision50—it is 
quite possible that most middle class and affluent voters were simply una-
ware of this record.  In the same way, they seem to have been unaware of 
the fact that most states—especially prior to the post-Kelo reforms—
defined blight so broadly that even middle class homes could easily be con-
demned on that basis.51  Indeed, it may be that large numbers of voters who 
support various types of post-Kelo reform are completely unaware of the 
existence of blight condemnations, just as the majority of citizens are some-
times unaware of the existence of  other important government policies.52 
Had they been aware of the true effects of many blight condemnations, 
it is far from clear that most voters would have approved of them.  A poll of 
800 New Jersey residents taken in the fall of 2006 found that eighty-six 
percent disapproved of  ―[t]ak[ing] low value homes from people in order to 
build higher value homes,‖ while only seven percent supported such con-
demnations.53  Many blight condemnations, of course do exactly that.54  Un-
less New Jersey opinion is highly unrepresentative of the rest of the 
country, it seems likely that ignorance, not contempt for the poor, accounts 





  Dana, supra note 1, at 20. 
48
  Id. at 10; see also Pritchett, supra note 29, at 14–43 (describing the history of this rationale). 
49
  Dana, supra note 1, at 21–22. 
50
  See Somin, supra note 5, at 37–43 (discussing political ignorance about eminent domain policy 
and its role in the Kelo backlash in great detail). 
51
  Id. at 38–39. 
52
  For example, a 2003 survey showed that 70 percent of respondents were unaware of the passage 
of President Bush‘s massive prescription drug bill, the largest new government program in almost forty 
years.  See Ilya Somin, Political Ignorance is No Bliss, Cato Institute Policy Analysis No. 525, Sept. 22, 
2004, at 6 tbl. 1 (link).  This paper also gives many similar examples of widespread ignorance about ma-
jor policy issues. 
53
  Janice Nadler et al., Government Takings of Private Property: Kelo and the Perfect Storm, in 
PUBLIC OPINION AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSY 23 tbl.4 (Nathan Persily et al. eds., forthcoming 
2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=962170 (link). 
54
  See Somin, supra note 29, at 94–95. 
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By the same token, it is possible that many of the low income survey 
respondents who support a ban on economic development takings also do 
so out of ignorance, perhaps not realizing that it won‘t protect them against 
blight condemnations.  This is less likely, however, since large numbers of 
poor people have personal experience with blight takings, either because 
they themselves have been displaced by them or because they may know 
other people who have.55  By contrast, very few middle class or wealthy 
voters are likely to have had comparable experiences. 
Finally, it is worth noting that even a knowledgeable and sophisticated 
voter might have rational reasons for supporting a ban on economic devel-
opment takings, while letting government retain the power to condemn at 
least some ―blighted‖ areas, narrowly defined.  As I have argued in great 
detail in a forthcoming article, market mechanisms can, in most cases, ac-
complish the goals of economic development takings without the need for 
eminent domain;56 by contrast, private sector elimination of blight may 
sometimes be stymied by collective action problems requiring government 
intervention to overcome.57  My own view is that a ban on blight condemna-
tions is probably desirable, even in spite of such concerns.  Other specialists  
surely disagree, however. 
In the absence of survey data directly addressing the issue, it is imposs-
ible to definitively determine whether Professor Dana‘s claim that voters 
are motivated by disdain for the interests of the poor is correct.  I suspect 
that a significant number of voters may indeed see the issue as he conjec-
tures, but most do not.  At this point, however, I emphasize only that his is 
only one of several possible explanations for the laws he describes and that 
there are competing explanations supported by at least some substantial 
evidence. 
Finally, it is important to note that even if Professor Dana is right about 
voters‘ motivations, the motives for enacting a law are less important than 
its effects.  As explained in Part I, a ban on economic development takings 
combined with a restrictive definition of blight can provide real benefits to 
the poor even if middle class voters do not intend such a result. 
CONCLUSION 
Twenty-seven of the thirty-six state reform laws enacted since 2005 do 
not reflect the combination of forbidding economic development condem-
nations, while permitting ―blight‖ condemnations only in poor areas that 
Professor Dana decries.  Most either ban both blight and economic devel-
opment takings or define ―blight‖ so broadly that even middle class homes 





  Since World War II, some 3.6 million mostly poor Americans have been displaced by ―urban re-
newal‖ condemnations alone.  Id. at 94. 
56
  Id. at 21–28. 
57
  Id. at 95. 
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To the extent that some post-Kelo reform laws do fit this pattern, it is 
far from clear that this harms the poor more than the status quo.  A ban on 
economic development takings provides at least some valuable protection 
for the poor, even if incomplete.  At the same time, there is little evidence 
that it inflicts any ―expressive harms‖ on them. 
The available evidence suggests that most of the poor either do not 
perceive a ban on economic development takings as an expressive harm 
against themselves, or at least do not believe that this harm outweighs the 
benefits of a ban.  It is also far from clear that those middle class and weal-
thy voters who continue to support ―blight condemnations‖ do so because 
of an invidious belief that the poor are less worthy of protection than they 
themselves.  Outside observers should therefore be cautious about inferring 
the existence of expressive harms unless and until we have firm evidence 
that they are real and that their magnitude is significant enough to outweigh 
the benefits—including the benefits to the poor—of a ban on economic de-
velopment takings.  Like most other legislation, post-Kelo reform laws 
should be judged by their effects, not by the intentions of their supporters. 
